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Abstract 
 
Electronic Health Records (EHRs) are organized around two kinds of statements: 
those reporting observations made, and those reporting acts performed. In neither 
case does the record involve any direct reference to what such statements are 
actually about. They record not: what is happening on the side of the patient, but 
rather: what is said about what is happening. While the need for a unique patient 
identifier is generally recognized, we argue that we should now move to an EHR 
regime in which all clinically salient particulars – from the concrete disorder on the 
side of the patient and the body parts in which it occurs to the concrete treatments 
given – should be uniquely identified. This will allow us to achieve interoperability 
among different systems of records at the level where it really matters: in regard to 
what is happening in the real world. It will also allow us to keep track of particular 
disorders and of the effects of particular treatments in a precise and unambiguous 
way. We discuss the ontological and epistemological aspects of our claim and 
describe a scenario for implementation within EHR systems.  
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1 Introduction 
Rector et al. have claimed that the information in the medical record consists of a collection 
of statements “not about what was true of the patient but [about] what was observed and 
believed by clinicians” [1]. They distinguish statements about direct observations 
concerning the patient (i.e. of what was heard, seen, thought, and done), and statements 
concerning the decision-making process and the clinical dialogue. In this way the authors 
seek to define the requirements to be satisfied by the EHR in order that it satisfies the 
criterion of “faithfulness to the clinical history and care of the patient”. The requirements 
they list, however, refer exclusively to facilities for managing the statements inside EHR 
systems. Thus for instance they require that: “the record should be capable of representing 
multiple instances of count nouns”. Count nouns are for example “fracture”, “tumor”, “leg” 
– nouns that can be pluralized (as contrasted with mass nouns like “urine”). The 
requirement is, therefore, as put forward by Rector et al., that the record should be capable 
of multiple representations not of fractures, tumors, legs themselves, but of the 
corresponding nouns, or rather (though we are not sure what meaning to assign to this 
phrase) of instances of such nouns. Indeed the insistence by Rector et al. that the record be 
a record of what was said rather than of what actually happened, positively rules out that it 
should contain representations of fractures, tumors or legs – or more generally of all those 
disorders, activities, symptoms, etc. which, as we believe, are of primary relevance to the 
health record. But this very fact, we believe, deprives the other requirements listed by 
Rector et al. – such as the requirement that the record allow conflicting statements – of the 
possibility of coherent application to real cases, since there is no way in which the entities 
about which there is supposed to be a disagreement could be explicitly referred to. 
Slightly more acceptable, in this respect, is the account proposed by Huff et al. [2], who 
take “the real world to consist of objects (or entities)”. They continue by asserting: 
“Objects interact with other objects and can be associated with other objects by 
relationships … When two or more objects interact in the real world, an ‘event’ is said to 
have occurred.” They then, encouragingly, base their account upon the events themselves, 
rather than upon statements about events. Each event receives an explicit identifier, called 
an event instance ID, which is used to link it to other events (reflecting the goal of 
supporting temporal reasoning with patient data). This ID serves as an anchor for 
describing the event via a frame-representation, where the slots in the frame are name-value 
tuples such as event-ID = “#223”, event-family = “diagnostic procedures”, procedure-type 
= “chest X-ray”, etc. The framework of [2] incorporates also explicit reference via other 
unique IDs to the patient, the physician and even to the radiographic film used in an X-ray 
image analysis event. Unfortunately, however, their ontological analysis stops here. Thus 
they fail to see the importance of explicitly referring also to what was observed. This is in 
spite of the fact that the very X-ray report that they analyse begins with the sentences: “PA 
view is compared to the previous examination dated 10-22-91. Surgical clips are again 
seen along the right mediastinum and right hilar region.” Because they have no means to 
refer directly to those clips, they must resort to a complex representation with nested and 
linked event frames in order to simulate such reference. Even then, however, they are not 
able to disambiguate as between an interpretation in which (i) the surgical clips seen in the 
mediastinum are different from those seen in the hilar region and (ii) there is only one set of 
clips that extends from the mediastinum into the hilar region.  
The limitations of the event-based representation force them also to create a different 
event-frame for each location of the clips (though neither clips nor locations are themselves 
events). That this approach is questionable is seen in the fact that, while it is certainly 
possible, when looking at a chest X-ray, to see first a clip in the mediastinum (first event), 
and then by looking again (in a second event) to see a second clip, it is equally possible that 
just one glance suffices for the observer to apprehend all the clips at the same time, i.e. in 
one event. (To rule out this possibility would be tantamount to claiming that complex 
perceptions, for example of a tree, must involve the subject participating simultaneously in 
several thousands of distinct events of observation.) 
Finally, we can mention Weed’s Problem Oriented Medical Record, the central idea of 
which is to organize all medical data around a problem list, thereby assigning each indivi-
dual problem a unique ID [3]. Unfortunately Weed proposes to uniquely identify only 
problems, and not the various particulars that cause the problems, are symptomatic for 
them, or are involved in their diagnosis or therapy. 
2 Some ontological and epistemological aspects of introducing unique identifiers for 
particular entities in health records 
We argue that the EHR should contain explicit reference, via unique identifiers, to the 
individual real world entities which are of relevance in such records – called “particulars” 
in what follows. These should be similar not only to the unique identifiers we already use to 
distinguish individual patients, individual physicians, individual healthcare organizations, 
individual invoices and credit card transactions, and even individual drug packages [4], but 
also to the proper names we use in natural language and to the identifiers we use, e.g. for 
web resources and automobile engines. When I enter a hospital with a fracture of my left 
first metatarsal base, then I would like this particular fracture, which prevents me from 
dancing and causes me a lot of pain, and of which the clinician examining me can see an 
image on an X-ray, to receive a unique ID for further reference. Only in this way can this 
fracture be distinguished not just from a second fracture in the same metatarsal, but also 
from the fracture in the very same place from which I suffered two years earlier. The 
bunion, in contrast, which the clinician observes when examining my foot, and of which 
there is also an image on the X-ray, should not receive at that time its own unique ID. 
Reference to it should be effected, rather, by means of the ID it received already two years 
ago, when it was diagnosed at the same time as the first fracture. True, the bunion is now 
much bigger; but it is still the same entity as it was when first observed.  
There are good reasons for the above. Coding systems such as ICD have labels such as 
“multiple fracture occurring in the same limb”, “multiple fracture occurring in different 
limbs”, and so forth. Statistics concerning the incidence of disorders would be erroneous if, 
because of unconstrained use of such labels, multiple observations of the same entity came 
to be counted as separate incidences of disorder. Few patients will care about such 
statistics, but they will care if having two fractures would make them eligible for cost 
reimbursement because of the different ways each fracture occurred.  
We would even like to go further: it is not just the particular fracture which should get 
an explicit ID, but also the particular bone in which it occurred. For it might happen that 
this bone is later transplanted into another patient, and becomes the cause of a malignancy 
in the recipient because tumor material in the bone was transplanted together with it [5]. 
What does it mean to assign identifiers to particulars in an EHR? First, we note that 
ontologies and terminologies have focused hitherto on what is general in reality, allowing 
particularization to occur almost exclusively where there is explicit reference to the human 
beings who are the bearers of named general attributes or to the times at which observations 
occurred or statements were made. The realm of particulars relevant to the health record is 
however vastly broader than this. Indeed, there are both particulars (tokens, instances), such 
as this bone of that person, and universals (types, classes), such as bone and person, 
throughout the entire domain of medical science. Thus there are the two particular 
fractures: the one from which I am now suffering, and one which occurred two years ago. 
But there is also the universal basal fracture of left first metatarsal, which is of course just 
as real as the particulars in which it inheres. There is the particular pain in my foot that I 
had two years ago, pain that was caused by that first fracture. And there is the pain from 
which I am suffering now, in the very same place. The pains may feel the same, but they 
are distinct entities nonetheless, though both are instances of the same universal. Universals 
and particulars exist in reality independently of our use of language. As such, they are 
distinguished from the concepts which are said to provide meanings for terms. 
Second, assigning a unique identifier tells us that the particular exists (or has existed in 
the past), and that nothing else is that particular. The particular does not come into 
existence because we assign an identifier to it: it must have existed before it became 
possible for such an assignment to be made. The assignment itself is then an act comparable 
to the act of naming a fetus or newborn child (or ship or artwork). 
Third, we would find in such an advanced EHR also statements about these assignment 
acts (and – to avoid the confusions one finds in the HL7 RIM [6] – these statements would 
be clearly distinguished from the acts they are intended to describe). We could then assign 
truth values to such statements, and we note that for such a statement to be true the 
particular referred to must exist (or have existed) and have no ID already assigned.  
Fourth, the use of an ID in a statement does not entail that an assignment has already 
been made. If an X-ray is ordered, then the X-ray event does not exist, and so it cannot be 
assigned an ID. But it is perfectly possible to reserve such an ID in advance. This 
difference opens up interesting perspectives in the medico-legal context. If the X-ray that 
was ordered is carried out, and the images reveal a pathology, then the physician who 
issued the order can use this fact as a justification of the claim that his initial judgment 
about the case had been accurate. The mere fact of his having issued the order may protect 
him from a lawsuit, even when the X-ray is not carried out. Of course, the information 
relevant to such analyses can be extracted also from conventional records. The point here is 
that the framework here advanced would allow for the automatic analysis of such cases, and 
possibly even for the automatic prevention of associated medical mistakes or hazards. 
Fifth, the mere fact of assigning an identifier to a particular does not imply that any 
statement is made about what kind of particular is involved. Such a statement is made only 
when one has grasped the relevant particular as an instance of some universal (such as 
“bone” or “fracture” or “pain”), and this often occurs only after the assignment or 
reservation of an ID. Statements of the given sort are then true only if the particular exists 
and is an instance of the claimed universal.  
3 Towards and implementation of referent tracking  
Let us go back to the emergency room of that modern hospital that I choose to be treated in 
because it has installed one of the new fancy EHR systems (EHRS) that allows careful and 
explicit reference to all my various problems and to the different kinds of entities associated 
therewith. Because of my story about what happened to my foot, and because of the pain 
the two attending physicians were able to induce by palpating my forefoot, both agreed that 
there was something wrong. That “something wrong” was given the ID #234, a meaning-
less consecutive number assigned automatically by the EHRS (and guaranteed to be unique 
according to some algorithm). The system at the same time also generated two statements, 
recording the assignment of #234 to that particular by each of the two physicians. These 
statements enjoy a high degree of positive evidence, since the referent-tracking database 
allows automatic checking to verify the absence of prior existing disorders of which my 
current problem might have been a continuation. It did find referent #15 for the left first 
metatarsal base fracture that I suffered from two years ago, but this – as witnessed by the 
X-ray image #98 taken half a year after the initial diagnosis – had since ceased to exist. The 
physicians also had good evidence that the referent-tracking database was complete in all 
relevant respects, since they knew that I never sought treatment elsewhere. The physicians’ 
statements concerning the assignment were each time-stamped both for occasion of 
utterance and for point of appearance in the EHRS. Note that these time-stamps do not 
necessarily imply assertions about when #234 itself began to exist. Also, at this stage, no 
statement has been made about which universal disorder #234 is an instance of.  
The physicians ordered and received three X-ray photographs taken of my foot from 
different angles. They both looked at the first (identified by the EHRS as #235 and stated to 
be an instance of the universal referred to by SNOMED-CT as “257444003: photograph”), 
but they saw nothing abnormal. Of course, they saw an image of my left first metatarsal 
bone, this image being identified as #286 (they did not bother to look for a SNOMED-CT 
code for such an image, knowing by experience that they would find nothing that comes 
close). They were at the same time aware that entity #286 is clearly different from entity 
#221, which is my left first metatarsal bone itself, and which they declared to be (i) an 
instance of the universal referred to by the SNOMED-CT concept “182121005: entire first 
metatarsal”, further annotated with the side-modifier “left”, and (ii) a part of #2 (me). On 
the second photograph (#236), both saw a thin hypodense line appearing towards the top of 
my left first metatarsal bone. They assigned that line in the image the label #287, and both 
stated it to be the image of some corresponding particular #288, thereby agreeing on the 
existence of #288 but disagreeing as to what universal it was an instance of – the one seeing 
it as a fracture line, the other as just a normal part of the bone somewhat less dense than the 
surrounding bony material. They agreed, however, that #287 was not an artefact, i.e. that it 
did indeed correspond to something in my body. On the third photograph (#237), both saw 
a clear fracture line, indisputably an image of a real fracture and identical with particular 
#288. They thereupon asserted that #234, i.e. the “something wrong” previously identified, 
was in fact an instance of the universal: left first metatarsal base fracture. 
4 EHR architecture standards and health particulars 
No current EHR architecture standards are to our knowledge able to deal with the tracking 
of all those types of referents that are required to support an implementation such as the one 
described above. The record architecture described in CEN prEN 13606-1:2004 draft [7] 
allows only a limited number of particulars to be referred to explicitly – i.e. without 
resorting to any external terminology – and as shown in Table 1 many of them (as we 
should expect, given what we observed in 1 above) are at the meta-level rather than at the 
level of direct care. Indirectly, it would be possible to use the “data item” construct as it is 
defined in CEN prEN 13606-1:2004 to refer to particulars – something that we strongly 
encourage, even though it would require an additional round of standardization. 
 
Direct care particulars Meta-level particulars 
1) the subject of care from whose EHR an 
extract is taken. This does not need to 
be the patient since an extract might 
contain data about an unborn child 
2) the healthcare agent which participates 
in some interaction with the subject of 
care 
3) a geographical location for any person 
(i.e. subject of care or human 
healthcare agent) or organization 
referred to 
4) the EHR provider system from which a record extract is 
being taken 
5) the EHR from which the extract is taken 
6) the different sorts of components involved in a record 
extract 
7) International Coding Scheme Identifier (ICSI) 
8) External Procedure Reference: rather than referring to a real 
procedure that is carried out, this refers to a specific 
document in which a procedure is generically described 
9) The software used in the EHR extract transmission process 
Table 1: The different sorts of particulars that can be identified in CEN prEN 13606-1:2004 
 
The HL7-RIM [8] is much worse in this respect. Particulars that are listed as “entities” can, 
it is true, be referred to by using the “Entity.Id” attribute: living subjects (either human or 
non-human), geographical places, organizations, and manufactured materials including 
devices and containers. Great care needs to be taken, however, since these labels are 
notoriously prone to inaccurate use. As an example, the class Person can be used to refer 
either to individuals or to groups, depending on how the attribute “Entity.Quantity” is set. 
As an example, a group with 60% females is to be represented as “Person(quantity = 100) 
has-part Person(quantity = 60; sex = female)”. And similarly with HL7-RIM’s notoriously 
problematic Act class. Perhaps (we do not know) the “Act.Id” attribute can be used to refer 
to concrete events. But then the Act class allows for “mood” (possible, planned, ordered, 
etc.) and “negation” attributes, so that a reference ID would sometimes need to be 
understood (in our terminology) as a reservation and sometimes as an assignment, though 
even this simple distinction is masked by layers of confusion. And in HL7-RIM, too, there 
is no room to refer to instances of body parts, of disorders, and so forth. The world of HL7, 
after all, is a world of Acts (Acts themselves being artefacts of the HL7 regime, rather than 
entities we could encounter in our everyday reality). Only a thorough reworking of the 
HL7-RIM, taking into account all aspects of reality, might solve these problems. 
5 Conclusion 
Nowadays, the medical informatics community prefers to restrict the use of ontology to the 
development of more or less well-structured vocabularies of general terms. Hardly at all 
does it care about the correct representation of particulars in reality – without which, of 
course, such vocabularies would be entirely superfluous. This is strange in an era in which 
the clinical community, i.e. the community that should be served by medical informatics, is 
focused so emphatically on Evidence Based Medicine. For on what should evidence be 
based, if not on real cases? The focus on what is general (for example on the compilation of 
statistics based on general classifications) was, perhaps, defensible in an era of limited 
computer resources. Under current conditions, however, we argue that only benefits would 
accrue from inaugurating EHR systems which are able to refer directly and systematically 
to concrete instances along the lines proposed in the above. If a hospital database is able to 
store all the SNOMED-CT codes that apply to a particular patient, then adding an addi-
tional reference ID to the particulars that are the relevant instances of the SNOMED classes 
will hardly create massive storage problems. CEN prEN 13606-1:2004, too can be adjusted 
quite easily along these lines, though of course adapting actual EHR systems in an 
appropriate way would involve a more substantial effort. Considerable organizational 
issues would above all still need to be resolved – as witnessed by the problems encountered 
in establishing a Unique Patient Identifier in a safe and secure manner [9]. But the benefits, 
in terms of better patient management, supporting advances in biomedical science, health 
cost containment and more reliable epidemiological data, can be expected to be enormous. 
And just as pseudonymisation is an effective approach to the collection of data about the 
same patient without disclosing his or her identity, so also the mechanism of ID assignment 
to disorders, body parts, etc. would provide additional avenues for supporting anonymity 
and thus promoting more and better HIPAA compliant research. 
6 References  
 
[1] Rector AL, Nolan WA, and Kay S. Foundations for an Electronic Medical Record. Methods of 
Information in Medicine 30: 179-86, 1991. 
[2]  Huff SM, Rocha RA, Bray BE, Warner HR, and Haug PJ. An Event Model of Medical Information 
Representation. J Am Med Informatics Assoc. 1995;2:116-134. 
[3]  Weed L. Medical Records That Guide And Teach. N Engl J Med 1968: 278: 593-600. 
[4]  Bell J. Drug firms see future in RFID technology. In: Cincinnati Business Courier, December 27, 2004. 
[5]  Collignon FP, Holland EC, Feng S. Organ Donors with Malignant Gliomas: An Update. Am J 
Transplant. 2004 Jan;4(1):15-21. 
[6] Vizenor L. Actions in health care organizations: an ontological analysis. Medinfo. 2004;2004:1403-10.  
[7]  CEN. Health informatics - Electronic healthcare record communication - Part 1: Extended architecture 
[8]  Case J, McKenzie L, Schadow G. (eds.) HL7 Reference Information Model. 
(http://www.hl7.org/Library/data-model/RIM/C30202/rim.htm) 
[9]  http://www.hipaanet.com/upin1.htm. 
 
Acknowledgments: The present paper was written under the auspices of the Wolfgang Paul Program of the 
Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, and the Network of Excellence in Semantic Interoperability and Data 
Mining in Biomedicine of the European Union. 
 
Address for correspondence: Dr. W. Ceusters, European Centre for Ontological Research, Universität des 
Saarlandes, Postfach 151150, D-66041 Saarbrücken , Germany 
